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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM:
EXPRESSING RELIGION, ATTIRE, AND
PUBLIC SPACES
Lucy Vickers*
INTRODUCTION
Religious expression has long been recognized as a
fundamental element of the right to religious freedom. Article 18
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”)1 and Article 9 European Convention on Human
Rights (“ECHR”)2 both protect the right to freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion, including the right to manifest religion
in worship, observance, practice, and teaching. The expression of
religion through religious attire is, in many cases, an important
aspect of religious observance and practice, and thus comes
within the protection of human rights law. As a result, the
question of how to respond to religious attire in public spaces has
traditionally been considered from a human rights perspective.

* Professor at Oxford Brookes University.
1
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). Article 18 reads,
in part:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and
freedom, either individually or in community with others and
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
worship, observance, practice, and teaching.
Id. at 178.
2
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, § 1, art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 230 [hereinafter European
Convention on Human Rights].
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Issues for debate have included the question of whether a dress
code is religiously required,3 and when the rights of others may
prevail over the right of an individual to express their religion.4
This Article revisits the debate over when religious attire may be
restricted in the public space through the alternative, but
complementary, perspective of equality. It suggests that viewing
this issue through the lens of equality may provide additional
insights for these debates, and argues that when assessing the
proportionality of any restriction on religious expression, the
interest in equality should be taken into account.
The Article focuses on the issue of religious dress as a form
of religious expression. It begins by addressing the human rights
approach to the protection of religious expression and discusses
some of the difficulties which can arise from this approach,
particularly with regard to the need to balance conflicting rights.
It then discusses the ways in which an approach based on equality
may provide additional insights into how to resolve some of those
difficulties. It ends with a consideration of the factors that may be
used when assessing the proportionality of restrictions on
religious expression.
I. HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION
Viewed from a human rights perspective, religious dress is
generally understood as an example of the manifestation of
religion. This manifestation of religion and belief is given
qualified protection in most human rights regimes.5 Such a view
allows plenty of scope for balancing human rights interests
against other rights, such as rights to equality, and it is in this
3

The debate over whether practices have to be religiously required or
merely religiously motivated is discussed in Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 7050/75, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 218 (1978).
4
An example of how the “rights of others” may prevail over the right to
religious expression can be seen in Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.
175, 206–07 and Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R 447, where the
equality rights of others prevailed over Sahin’s religious rights.
5
See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 9;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, art. 18, § 3.
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context that the interaction of rights related to religious
expression via religious attire and the rights of others has
traditionally been discussed. For example, under Article 9 of the
ECHR the protection of religious expression is limited where
necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others. In the context of
religious dress, these limitations could, for example, be used to
justify the removal of face veils in order to ensure proper
identification at national borders,6 or to justify restrictions on
flowing garments in order to limit infection control in hospitals.7
Such examples are relatively uncontroversial. More contentious is
when religious expression contests the broader category of “the
rights and freedoms of others.”8 This raises a problem at the
heart of religious freedom—whether the positive right to freedom
of religion encompasses a corresponding negative right9 to have
no religion or to be free from religion. Recognition of a negative
right to religious freedom potentially allows for sweeping
restrictions on religious expression. According to this view,
religious attire may be restricted in public in order to protect the
rights of those who wish to enjoy a public space free from
religion and religious symbols.10
In human rights law the method developed to manage the
conflict between different rights is to undertake a balancing
See FOI Release, Guidance on How to Treat Women Wearing
Clothing That Covers Their Face, UK Home Office (July 1, 2010),
http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guidance-on-how-to-treat-womenwearing-clothing-that-covers-their-face.
7
Health and safety reasons were accepted by the European Court of
Human Rights as a legitimate aim for restrictions on religious dress in a
hospital in Eweida v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10,
51671/10, and 36516/10, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R.
8
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 9.
9
A “negative right” is a right not to do something, which in this case, is
a right to be free from religion, or a right not to practice a religion.
10
For examples of the European Court of Human Rights cases discussing
an interest in being free from religious influence and referring to the fact that
Muslims who wear the headscarf can put under pressure those Muslims who
choose not to, see Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 175, 206–07;
Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R 447.
6
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approach to determine where the correct boundaries of protection
should lie. Human rights courts are experienced in seeking to
resolve conflicting interests this way. Of course, such a balance
can be hard to find, especially when human rights conventions
are operating on a transnational level. In response, the European
Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR) has developed the
notion of the “margin of appreciation,” which allows a degree of
flexibility to member states in their observance of the ECHR.
This mechanism provides the member states of the ECHR with a
“margin of appreciation” in setting the parameters of their
domestic law, and states that restrictions will only be found to
breach human rights norms when they fall outside this margin.11
The margin of appreciation has particular significance with
respect to freedom of religion cases and a fairly wide margin
operates with regard to these cases in Europe, reflecting the lack
of consensus about how freedom of religion cases should be
treated.12 Indeed, this flexible approach means that there is no
uniform approach to religious attire in Europe, despite being
governed by a common human rights code. Some member states
of the ECHR such as Turkey, France, and Belgium impose
significant restrictions on religious attire at work and in the public
space more generally.13 However, most other signatory states of
the ECHR14 allow religious attire in public, with the UK allowing
11

Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep.
737, 753 (1980).
12
See CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 143–44 (2001). For example, in France the
public sphere is strictly neutral, whereas the UK and Denmark have
established churches.
13
For an overview of the French position, see HANA VAN OOIJEN,
RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN PUBLIC FUNCTIONS: UNVEILING STATE NEUTRALITY:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DUTCH, ENGLISH AND FRENCH JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR LIMITING THE FREEDOM OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS TO DISPLAY RELIGIOUS
SYMBOLS (2012). The Turkish position is set out in Sahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct.
H.R. 17.
14
The ECHR signatories include forty-seven member states, twenty-eight
of which are members of the European Union. They are: Albania, Andorra,
Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
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perhaps the widest scope for when religious attire can be worn in
public, including a range of public employment such as the police
and judiciary.15 This broad range of responses to the question of
what is the proper scope for restricting religious attire in the
public space can serve as an illustration of how the “margin of
appreciation” works in that they show that all these different
responses, from the most restrictive of religious dress to the most
liberal, can be lawful responses to the requirement to provide
protection for religious freedom under the ECHR. In effect, as
long as the protection for religion does not fall outside the range,
or margin, it will remain lawful under the ECHR. These
mechanisms enable the ECtHR to support a range of responses
with regard to the issue of religious symbols, while maintaining a
human rights-based approach to the issue.
An example of this balancing mechanism can be found in the
2005 Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Sahin v. Turkey.16
In this case, a university student objected to the prohibition on
religious attire being worn in her university and the ECHR17
balanced the religious freedom of the student against the Turkish
government’s interest in the protection of state neutrality.18 In
reaching the conclusion that the ban was compatible with the
ECHR, the court relied on the mechanism of the margin of
appreciation and gave a wide margin to the Turkish government
to decide whether it was in fact “necessary” in the Turkish
political and cultural context to prohibit the wearing of religious
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Republic of Moldova, Monaco,
Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian
Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine,
and the United Kingdom.
15
For an overview of the approaches to this matter in France, England,
and the Netherlands, see VAN OOIJEN, supra note 13.
16
2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 175.
17
For a general introduction to the European Court of Human Rights, see
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(Pieter van Dijk et al., eds., 4th ed. 2006) [hereinafter THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF ECHR].
18
Sahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 207–08.
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symbols in teaching institutions. In the Sahin case, the ECHR
recognized that the state’s primary interest was the need to
protect secularism in the public sphere. Similarly, with regard to
the pending case regarding the “burqa ban,” S.A.S v. France,19
the state interest is framed in terms of security, the need to
uphold gender equality, and to avoid Muslim women being cut
off from society. These interests will need to be balanced against
those of the individual women whose freedom of religious
expression is severely limited by the ban.
Although the approach to conflicting rights based on the
balancing of interests within a margin of appreciation approach is
well established,20 nonetheless profound questions remain about
whether the resulting variety of practice across different countries
should be acceptable within a single legal framework such as the
ECHR. Greater clarity and consistency between different
countries is desirable for a number of reasons. A key reason is
because religious attire can form a significant element of religious
identity, and it is important for individuals to have clarity about
the extent to which this element of identity can be expressed in
public. If religiously orthodox doctors and nurses, wishing to
express religious faith through their attire, can do so in the U.K.
but not in other parts of the E.U., then those same doctors and
nurses are likely to not exercise the free movement of persons
enjoyed by other citizens. Moreover, the need for consistency
becomes particularly acute when the interference with religious
freedom reaches beyond specific situations of work and education
into the public sphere more generally. This can be seen through
bans on the wearing of face coverings in public in France,
S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11; see also Press Release, Grand
Chamber Hearing Concerning the Prohibition on Wearing the Full-Face Veil
in Public in France, European Court of Human Rights (Nov. 27, 2013),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng-press/pages/search.aspx?i=003-45847095542384.
20
See THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ECHR, supra note 17; see also
HOWARD C. YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE
DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (1996); Thomas A.
O’Donnell, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standard in the
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 4 HUM. RTS. Q. 474
(1982).
19
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Belgium, and the Netherlands.21
However, there is danger inherent in forced clarity and
consistency. Clarity and consistency in the legal treatment of
religious attire might seem inherently desirable; certainly clarity
will help both those subject to the law and those enforcing the law
to be clear about what can and cannot be worn in public or at
work. However, flexibility may be essential given the range of
current practices across different jurisdictions and the lack of
agreement about what should and should not be allowed in terms
of religious dress. Moreover, the flexibility inherent in the
balancing and “margin of appreciation” approach in human rights
law remains attractive as it allows for a detailed examination of
the facts of each case and for its context. One contextual issue
that could be helpful in assessing how to treat religious attire is
that of equality. In the next section of this article, I turn to
consider the matter of religious attire from the perspective of
equality, to consider whether arguments used in equality law can
provide new ways to approach the debate.
II. AN EQUALITY PERSPECTIVE ON RELIGIOUS ATTIRE
Approaching the issue of religious attire from a perspective of
equality will involve considering whether restrictions on attire
have a differential impact on individuals on equality grounds. For
example, it may be that restrictions impact differently on men and
women, or on those of one religion more than another. Where
this is the case, it can be seen that restrictions not only have
implications for religious freedom but for gender and religious
equality too.
One particular concern related to religious freedom which
may be viewed differently from an equality perspective is the
issue of state neutrality. The need for a neutral public sphere is
often viewed as in competition with claims for religious
freedom.22 However, it is important to note when considering
restrictions on religious expression from an equality perspective
21
22

See VAN OOIJEN, supra note 13.
See, e.g., Sahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 175.
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that legal arguments based on the value of “state neutrality”
appear in a different light from when they are based on human
rights perspectives. In effect, strict state neutrality fails to achieve
equality because our social organization can never be truly
“neutral.” The reason for this is two-fold. First, a strict neutrality
position tends to assume that we can make a clear separation
between the public and private spheres, and that it actually is
“neutral” if the public sphere is “neutral.” However, if we
consider lessons from equality jurisprudence, we can see that
what may look “neutral” can in practice favor the dominant
group. For example, in the U.S. it was recognized early on in
discrimination jurisprudence that neutral rules can have a
disparate impact on disadvantaged groups.23 The resulting concept
of indirect discrimination was imported into UK law in the Sex
Discrimination Act of 1975, and then into EU law in the 1980s.24
Thus, in the context of gender discrimination, it is well
established that “neutral” norms tend in practice to be male
norms, so that neutral rules requiring, for example, that workers
be available to work full time, can be indirectly discriminatory on
grounds of gender because fewer women than men can comply
with them.
This issue with “neutrality” can clearly be seen in the context
of religion and belief, where the social organization is largely
“Christian” rather than neutral. This means that most workers
enjoy a day off from work on Sundays, as well as time off at
Christmas and Easter. Thus religiously observant Christians will
rarely come across work rules and dress codes with which they
cannot comply, unless they work in an area of work that requires
staffing all week. This situation arises because of the historical
dominance of Christianity in Europe and the U.S., creating a
See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Lord Lester of Herne Hill, Equality and United Kingdom Law: Past,
Present, and Future, 2001 PUB. L. 77. See also Council Directive 76/207, O.J.
23
24

L. 39/40 (1976) (“[T]”he principle of equal treatment shall mean that there
shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or
indirectly . . . .”). This directive is often referred to as the Equal Treatment
Directive.
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system where the wider society is organized in ways that are
compatible with mainstream Christian practice.
Second, not only have the dominant social organizations
adapted to accommodate mainstream Christian practice; but also
Christianity itself has, arguably, adapted to the idea of the
“secular” or at least “neutral” social model adopted in much of
the EU and also in the U.S. This results, again, in Christians
being able to comply more easily with workplace rules than
individuals of other religions. A simple example illustrates the
adaptability of Christianity: early Christians adapted the pagan
winter festivals and turned those once pagan festivals into today
what is known as Christmas. Arguably this helped the young
religion gain acceptance in what was otherwise a hostile
environment. Moreover, there is some Biblical authority which
supports such an adaptive process: the command to “give to God
what is God’s and to Caesar what is Caesar’s”25 provides many
Christians a relatively easy method to reconcile civic duty with
religious duty.
In addition to these examples of Christianity’s adaptability to
secular power, Protestant Christianity in particular has developed
a specific theology that makes it adaptive. This involves the idea
of the separation between body and mind, with faith more a
matter of the mind and its state of “righteousness” than a matter
of the body.26 This, again, arguably allows for greater
accommodation of secularism within Christianity itself. A full
theological discussion of these ideas is beyond the scope of this
Article, but put simply, Christian theology is largely based on
orthodoxy or “correct belief.” Although debates of course
continue within Christianity about the precise relationship
between “faith” and “works,” nonetheless, the religion is based
less on what the individual does and more on what he or she
believes (in religious terms, his or her relationship with God).
This means that the focus is on belief, and so dress codes and

25
26

Matthew 22:21.
See generally THE OXFORD HANDBOOK

Juergensmeyer ed., 2006).

OF

GLOBAL RELIGIONS (Mark
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rules of attire, together with strict dietary rules or prayer rituals,
tend to be less central as signifiers of religious observance. In
contrast, religions such as Judaism and Islam have a greater focus
on orthopraxy: a concern for correct religious practice as
signifiers of religious adherence. In these traditions, codes of
conduct related to attire, diet, and prayers have greater
prominence as means to practice and observe religion. It is these
religious practices that can cause conflicts with the secular world.
The greater focus on orthodoxy in Christianity, rather than
orthopraxy, may provide an additional explanation of the relative
lack of conflict between Christian practice and the secular world.
It is arguable, then, that the adaptive process between the
secular Euro-American world and Christianity has been a twoway process. In part, the “world” has adapted to accommodate
the dominant religion. One example is recognition of Sunday as
the Sabbath day of Christianity and thus generally recognized as a
day of rest. But in part, Christianity itself has adapted so that
conflicts are reduced: there are few external requirements, such
as head covering, for observant Christians to comply with,
requirements which might otherwise conflict with secular
practice.
If these theological understandings are brought into the debate
over equality and religious attire, it becomes clear that so-called
“neutral” rules, which prohibit the wearing of religious attire, are
doubly non-neutral. First, it is more likely that adherents to
minority faiths have rules of observance that are of such religious
significance. Second, such rules can have a disparate impact upon
adherents of minority faiths because the rules of those minority
faiths are less likely to be compatible with mainstream social
norms. This means that although rules which restrict religious
attire can seem formally neutral, in practice they have a disparate
impact on religious minorities.
The importance within religions of “right conduct” explains
why some religiously observant individuals may appear to be
what has been termed “obdurate believers,”27 or those who will
This phrase was coined by Anthony Bradney in his essay, Faced by
Faith, in FAITH IN LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 90, 91 (Peter Oliver et al.
27
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not yield their religious beliefs or practices to other interests. For
such individuals, a choice between removing religious attire and
leaving the public space will not result in the removal of religious
attire. Thus a seemingly neutral public space will be achieved at
the expense of the religious believer, whose belief will remain
hidden. In the context of religions based on orthodoxy, a split
between private religious observance and public religious
neutrality can be understood in terms of separating the personal
and the public: what is God’s is private, and can be kept private;
what is public (“Caesar’s”) can remain in public.28 The split
remains a reasonably neat solution to the problem of reconciling
personal religion with the neutral public space. However, applied
to religions of orthopraxy, attempts to exclude personal belief
from the public sphere results in the exclusion of the person
altogether.
The importance of “orthopraxy” in some faiths explains the
inequality that can arise when certain religious practices are
restricted in public, and lessons from an equality perspective may
be instructive in this context. For example, it has long been
recognized that if women’s participation at work is to be
increased, then some accommodation of the family is needed.
This can be through a workplace nursery provision, maternity
leave, or other support for working mothers. If the argument
were to be accepted that women’s family responsibilities are
private matters, best left in the private sphere, then there would
be no need for such workplace provisions. Yet within Europe it
has been accepted that such an approach does not lead women to
work on equal terms with men.29 If no accommodation of family
life is offered, then many women will not leave their “personal
matters” at home and head out to work; instead, they will stay at
home. Many of the hard-won workplace rights, such as maternity
leave, are predicated on the idea that such practical support is
necessary if women are to be able to participate in the
eds., 2000).
28
29

Matthew 22:21.

See, for example, the extensive workplace protection for gender
equality within the European Union, going back to 1957 when the principle of
equal pay for equal work became part of the founding Treaty of Rome.
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workplace.30 This lesson can be applied outside of the workplace,
too: if we wish to include people in our societies, we need to
provide some reasonable level of accommodation for their basic
needs.
Applied to the ground of religion and belief, this equalitybased reasoning suggests that outright bans on religious
expression will lead to unequal results. Bans on religious
expression will have a disparate impact on minority religious
groups; they will lead to the removal of individuals holding these
beliefs from the public sphere and will hamper attempts to
include such individuals in mainstream society. Thus, it is clear
that if inclusion of religious minorities is a society’s aim, then
some accommodation of religious practice is essential. If
headscarves are banned at work, many Muslim women will not
remove the headscarf and go to work; they will stay at home. If
turbans cannot be worn by public sector workers, Sikh men will
not cut their hair; they will just not work in the public sector.
Arguments based on this reasoning apply to the public space as
well: if face coverings are banned in the public sphere, those
women who wear them will in effect be excluded from the public
sphere.
These arguments, based on the perspective of equality law,
demonstrate that what can look like simple neutrality may not, in
practice, be experienced as neutral. The public sphere is not as
neutral as might at first be supposed and the religions themselves
are not equally placed in relation to the public space, meaning
that similar treatment of religious individuals will not result in all
of those individuals having the same experience. Religious groups
are not alike, and equal treatment by way of the neutral public
space will not result in “like” experiences. It is clear that policies
which do not accommodate religious differences ensure there is
no equal participation in public life; instead there is exclusion.
Thus, if we exclude the personal from the public sphere, we
exclude the person as well.
These equality-based perspectives suggest that an absolute ban
on religious attire in the public space fails to give sufficient
30

See SANDRA FREDMAN, WOMEN AND THE LAW (1998).
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recognition to the interests of religious individuals. They suggest
that the better legal response is to ensure, instead, that there is
consideration of the nuances and complexity involved in
regulating religious practice. As has been argued above,
responding to the plural religious landscape by creating a purely
secular public space fails to recognize the deeply unequal way
this would affect religious minorities. Instead, a more plural
public space is required, with room for the religious and the
secular to coexist, and even to engage in dialogue with one
another.
To suggest a plural public space, however, is not to suggest
that restrictions on religious freedom can never be imposed.
Human rights protection for religion does not require absolute
protection for religious practice. It does require, however, that
any restrictions on religion have a legitimate aim, and that the
restrictions on religious practice remain proportionate to that aim.
Proportionality requires that no more be done to restrict the
religious practice than is needed to achieve the legitimate aim.31
The second part of this paper considers how and when restrictions
on religious expression, through religious attire, may be justified,
viewed through the equality context.
III. WHEN WILL RESTRICTIONS
JUSTIFIED?

ON

RELIGIOUS ATTIRE BE

The ECtHR has heard a number of human rights cases (some
referred to above),32 all involving challenges to the prohibition of
religious dress at work. In these cases the prohibitions on
religious dress at work have been upheld.33 In Dahlab v.
Switzerland, for example, the ECtHR held that the prohibition of
the headscarf imposed on a Muslim teacher of young children
See Council Directive 2000/78, art. 2, §(2)(b), 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16,
18–19 (EC).
32
Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 175; Dahlab v. Switzerland,
2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447; Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R..
33
See Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 175; Dahlab v. Switzerland,
2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447; Karaduman v. Turkey, App. No. 16278/90, 74 Eur.
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 93 (1993).
31
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was proportionate because the teacher had influence on the
intellectual and emotional development of children.34 The court
also took into account the fact that, as a public sector employee,
the teacher was a “representative of the state.”35 The court also
mentioned in its reasoning the fact that the headscarf is “hard to
square with the principle of gender equality.”36 In Sahin v.
Turkey37 the court balanced the religious freedom of a student
against the Turkish government’s interest in the protection of
state neutrality, in holding that the restriction on wearing a
headscarf was justified. The court also noted the government’s
argument that the wearing of a headscarf may put other students
under pressure to adopt more fundamentalist approaches to their
faith.
However, viewed from an equality perspective, and drawing
on the insights discussed above, it can be strongly argued that
these decisions fail to respect the equality interests of religious
minorities. Instead, a more sensitive approach to justification is
needed; one that takes into consideration the wide range of
factors involved in cases involving religious expression through
attire and other symbols.
An example of a more sensitive consideration of the factors
that can be relevant when considering restrictions on religious
attire can be seen in the case of Azmi v. Kirklees Metropolitan
Borough Council.38 Azmi was a teaching assistant who wanted to
wear the niqab39 when in the presence of male colleagues.40 She
was dismissed for refusing the employer’s request to remove the
niqab when assisting in class.41 Her initial claim to the court

34

Dahlab, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 449–50.
Id. at 462.
36
Id. at 463.
37
Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 175, 204–05.
38
Azmi v. Kirklees Met. Borough Council, [2007] I.C.R. 1154, available
at 2007 WL 1058367.
39
A niqab is a face-covering for women that veils the face and hair down to
the shoulders, with a small opening for the eyes.
40
Azmi, [2007] I.C.R. at 1157.
41
Id. at 1161.
35
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alleging direct and indirect discrimination was unsuccessful.42
The court did accept that there was prima facie indirect
discrimination since the refusal to allow Azmi to wear the niqab
put her at a particular disadvantage when compared with others,43
but the indirect discrimination was justified. The court held that
the restriction on wearing the niqab was proportionate given the
need to uphold the interests of the children in having the best
possible education.44 What is interesting about the case is that the
court noted45 that the school had performed a thorough
investigation before reaching the conclusion that the restriction
was necessary. For example, it undertook a review of Azmi’s
teaching to see if the quality of teaching was reduced when Azmi
wore the face covering and came to the conclusion that it was; the
school also investigated whether it was possible to rearrange
Azmi’s timetable to enable her to assist only in classes with a
female teacher and found that this was not possible.46 In relation
to the question of justification, Azmi however argued that
insufficient effort had been made to try to accommodate her
religious requirements; for example, the school could have tried
to assess alternative ways to improve her communication and
performance when wearing the niqab.47 The court, however, held
that the school had sufficiently shown that the restriction on
wearing the niqab was proportionate to the school’s aim of
providing effective education for the students.48
The Azmi case illustrates how a proportionate response to
what might otherwise be indirectly discriminatory can require a
careful review of the facts and circumstances of the case. This
“fact-sensitive” approach can enable a full analysis to be
undertaken to determine whether any accommodation of the
42

She also claimed victimization and was successful due to inadequacies
on the part of the employer in dealing with her case. See id. at 1155.
43
Under the U.K. Equality Act 2010 and the E.U. Equality Directive
2000/78 indirect discrimination occurs where a person is put at a particular
disadvantage by an apparently neutral rule.
44
Azmi, [2007] I.C.R. at 1169, 1172.
45
Id. at 1172.
46
Id. at 1169–70.
47
Id. at 1160.
48
Id. at 1169–70.
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religious practice can be achieved without compromising the
competing interests at stake. In Azmi, the court found that the
competing interest in maximizing the children’s educational
experience could not be achieved if the required accommodation
was given.49 It is noteworthy that in Azmi the religious practice
involved the covering of the face, which was found to impede
communication in a context where non-verbal communication is
essential. It is quite possible that in other cases, where the
religious practice does not directly affect the purpose of
employment, some accommodation of religious practice may be
required in order to avoid the disparate impact that such
restrictions can have on religious minorities.
A similar fact-sensitive approach can be seen in R (on the

application of Begum) v. Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh
High School.50 The case involved a pupil’s freedom of religious

expression that was in conflict with the rights of others; here the
right of the school to determine the dress code for the school. The
school had a uniform which prohibited a female student from
wearing the jilbab.51 The reason for imposing the uniform was to
promote harmony between the different races, religions, and
cultures represented in the school, and to foster a sense of
cohesion and community within the school. There had been some
history of conflict between pupils in the past, with pupils defining
themselves along racial lines, and the school viewed the uniform
as necessary as a way to combat these problems and to prevent
the development of sub-groups identified by dress.52 In the case,
the English House of Lords was asked to review a school’s
decision not to allow Begum to attend school wearing the jilbab.
As with Azmi, the court upheld the decision of the school,53 but
only after a careful, fact-intensive review. The court recognized
49

Id. at 1172.
R (on the application of Begum) v. Headteacher & Governors of Denbigh
High Sch., [2006] UKHL 15, (appeal taken from Eng.), available at 2006 WL
690559.
51
A loose fitting garment which hides the contours of the body, associated
with Muslim women.
52
Id. at [18].
53
Begum, [2006] UKHL 15 at [40]–[41], [71], [91], [99].
50
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that the school had undertaken detailed discussion in reaching its
decision.54 The school had consulted local religious leaders and
had uniform requirements which met with common Islamic dress
codes, in that it allowed for several uniform options, one of
which was a salwar kameez55 which could be worn with the
school tie and school jumper.56 The court recognized that the
school’s decision creating the uniform requirements had been
discussed fairly carefully beforehand. The House of Lords also
noted that there was evidence that the school had previously
suffered the ill effects of groups of pupils defining themselves
along racial lines, with consequent conflict between them.57 Thus,
based on the facts and due to the careful appraisal at the local
level, the House of Lords upheld the restrictions on religious
attire imposed by the school since the restriction struck a
proportionate balance between the conflicting interests at stake in
the case.58
Of course it will always be arguable that the court could have
reached a different conclusion: it may be that Begum could have
been accommodated without undue harm to others.59 However,
although one might disagree with the conclusion reached in the
case, it is clear that the court’s use of fact-based decision making
allowed for a more contextual and sensitive decision. This type of
decision making allows space in the legal framework for the
complexity of the issue to be considered. This way the decision
making process includes a full examination of religious freedom
and equality concerns.
The benefit of submitting any prohibition on religious attire to
the test of proportionality, assessed in light of a detailed factual
examination, as was done in Azmi and Begum, is that a wide
range of factors can be taken into account to decide the legality of
54

Id. at [33].
A sleeveless smock-like dress with the loose trousers.
56
Begum, [2006] UKHL 15at [34].
57
Id. at [18].
58
Id. at [68], [98].
59
See Susanna Mancini, The Power of Symbols and Symbols as Power:
Secularism and Religion as Guarantors of Cultural Convergence, 30 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2629, 2654 (2009).
55
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a prohibition. This allows for a nuanced examination of the facts,
which reflects the context of the prohibition, the rights of others
such as pupils or colleagues, additional options that may be open
to the individual, and the practical effect of any gender-based
claims. For example, restrictions on headscarves on the basis that
men impose them on women, or that headscarves create social
pressure on others to conform, should be tested empirically.
There is evidence that the courts’ assumptions that headscarves
are worn by Muslim women because their male relatives force
them to do so is incorrect in many cases.60 This is not to deny that
in some instances this may happen, but, equally, legal policy
should not be made on the assumption that this is usually the
case. A model of legal protection based on a detailed review of
the facts and circumstances surrounding each individual case
enables courts and tribunals to reach reasoned decisions that are
both flexible and responsive to the complexity of the issues
involved.
While there are many benefits to a factually sensitive review
as a model of protection for religious attire in the public sphere,
such an approach does have some drawbacks. In particular, it can
lead to uncertainty and inconsistency of approaches between
different courts and different contexts. This can make it difficult
to predict with certainty how any individual case will be resolved.
For example, in Begum, the House of Lords stated:
It is important to stress at the outset that this case
concerns a particular pupil and a particular school
in a particular place at a particular time. It must be
resolved on facts which are now, for purposes of
the appeal, agreed. The House is not, and could
not be, invited to rule whether Islamic dress, or
any feature of Islamic dress, should or should not
be permitted in the schools of this country.61
The court is extremely clear that it is not setting precedent for
60

See Melanie Adrian, France, the Veil and Religious Freedom, 34
RELIGION, ST. & SOC’Y 345, 349 (2009); see also Eva Brems, Face Veil Bans in
the European Court of Human Rights: The Importance of Empirical Findings,
22 J.L. & POL’Y 517 (2014).
61
Begum, [2006] UKHL 15 at [2].
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how other schools should determine the issue of uniform and
Islamic dress. Instead, the judgment focuses on the process by
which the issue of religious attire should be determined: that the
decision should be made with due acknowledgment of the impact
any decision may have on religious freedom.
An additional concern with such a fact sensitive review is that
the many and varied factors identified as relevant in the
consideration of proportionality on any restriction of religious
expression may create a false sense of objectivity, masking the
fact that the judgment is ultimately personal and subjective. This
potentially runs the danger of perpetuating precisely the
disadvantage that the creation of legal protection for religious
interests should prevent, namely the dominance of minority
religious interests by the majority.
The concern over undue subjectivity is a powerful argument,
but while fact-sensitive review may never be fully objective,
neither is it fully subjective. The factors to determine the proper
boundaries of religious expression when balanced against other
concerns, are not drawn at random but are chosen as a result of
careful consideration of the range of competing interests at stake.
This includes the extent to which any claims are empirically
valid, and the theoretical reasons for protecting the competing
interests at all. Not every interest will be relevant. Thus, this
fact-based proportionality approach relies on reasoned and
principled analysis to determine which factors are relevant.
Moreover, this proportionality approach allows room for any
decision relating to religious attire to be tested: any decisions
reached must be open, and the factors which were relevant
subject to review. Although ultimately courts may allow for some
flexibility in the exercise of any discretion by decision makers
such as schools or employers, this approach allows for challenges
to be made if an important factor has been left out of the
equation. Thus, a determination that an individual cannot wear
religious attire at work or in school must be proportionate; it
must take into account not only the needs of the business or
school, but also the individual’s interest in freedom of religious
expression. Where the religious interests of the employee have
not been taken into account, this may mean that a decision can be
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challenged on the basis that it is disproportionate.
In sum, although there may be strong equality-based reasons
to favor a plural public space, some restrictions on religious
freedom will inevitably be necessary. Subjecting any proposed
restriction on religion to a fact-sensitive proportionality review
should mean that contextually sensitive decisions can be reached,
with full account taken of relevant equality concerns.
CONCLUSION
An approach to the question of when and to what extent a
person should enjoy freedom of religious expression via their
choice of attire can be considered both from a human rights
perspective and from an equality perspective. Of course these two
perspectives are inherently linked, but nonetheless are different.
The consideration of equality concerns in this context serves to
highlight the need for sensitive responses to calls to restrict
religious attire in the public sphere. Without a clear
understanding of the equality dimensions to the debate, questions
about the role of religious attire may be resolved merely from the
point of view of competing interests in religious freedom: the
balance being between the right to freedom of religious
expression and the rights of others to be free from religious
symbols, particularly in the public sphere. Moreover, the use of
the margin of appreciation in European human rights law means
that the final standard of review on any restrictions of religious
attire is weak: restrictions are effectively assessed against a
“norm-reflecting” standard. This means that the case law under
ECHR tends to accept current standards of protection for
religion, even where standards are fairly low, rather than
engaging in the setting of high standards of rights protection.
One of the reasons for weak protection for religious claims in
the public space has been the competing interest in having a
religiously neutral or secular public sphere. Yet while calls for a
secular public space certainly have validity, when revisited in the
light of the concerns that can be raised from an equality
perspective, such claims lose some of their force. The recognition
that secular or neutral public spaces lead to unequal outcomes for
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different, and usually minority, religious groups means that
additional factors need to be taken into account when balancing
competing rights. I propose that, when assessing the
proportionality of any restrictions on religious attire, the interest
in equality needs to be added to the balance, and an approach
allowing for the setting of standards needs to be used, rather than
the norm-reflecting margin of appreciation. With the recognition
that unequal results can arise from a reliance on neutrality in the
public sphere, it becomes clear that outright bans on the wearing
of religious attire in the public sphere are unsustainable. This is
not to say that more limited restrictions will never be allowed: as
the discussion of the cases of Azmi and Begum illustrate, there
remains scope for religious attire to be restricted, but only after
careful review of the facts of the case. This more fact-sensitive
review allows for the complexity of the issues surrounding
religious equality and religious expression to have its proper
space in the legal discourse.

